The Honorable Edward J. Markey
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
Energy and Commerce Committee
U.S. House of Representatives
2108 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Markey:

Thank you for your letter regarding recent media reports concerning the collection of telephone records by the National Security Agency. In your letter, you note that section 222 of the Communications Act provides that “[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to . . . customers.” 47 U.S.C. § 222(a). You have asked me to explain the Commission’s plan “for investigating and resolving these alleged violations of consumer privacy.”

I know that all of the members of this Commission take very seriously our charge to faithfully implement the nation’s laws, including our authority to investigate potential violations of the Communications Act. In this case, however, the classified nature of the NSA’s activities makes us unable to investigate the alleged violations discussed in your letter at this time.

The activities mentioned in your letter are currently the subject of an action filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs in that case allege that the NSA has “arrang[ed] with some of the nation’s largest telecommunications companies . . . to gain direct access to . . . those companies’ records pertaining to the communications they transmit.” Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-0672-VRW (N.D. Cal.), Amended Complaint ¶ 41 (Feb. 22, 2006). According to the complaint, for example, AT&T Corp. has provided the government “with direct access to the contents” of databases containing “personally identifiable customary proprietary network information (CPNI),” including “records of nearly every telephone communication carried over its domestic network since approximately 2001, records that include the originating and terminating telephone numbers and the time and length for each call.” Id. ¶¶ 55, 56, 61; see also, e.g., Leslie Cauley, “NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls,” USA Today A1 (May 11, 2006) (alleging that the NSA “has been secretly collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided” by major telecommunications carriers).
The government has moved to dismiss the action on the basis of the military and state secrets privilege. *See Hepting*, Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment by the United States of America (May 12, 2006). Its motion is accompanied by declarations from John D. Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, and Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, Director, National Security Agency, who have maintained that disclosure of information “implicated by Plaintiffs’ claims . . . could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security of the United States.” Negroponte Decl. ¶ 9. They specifically address “the NSA’s purported involvement” with specific telephone companies, noting that “the United States can neither confirm nor deny alleged NSA activities, relationships, or targets,” because “[i]f, to do otherwise when challenged in litigation would result in the exposure of intelligence information, sources, and methods and would severely undermine surveillance activities in general.” Alexander Decl. ¶ 8.

The representations of Director Negroponte and General Alexander make clear that it would not be possible for us to investigate the activities addressed in your letter without examining highly sensitive classified information. The Commission has no power to order the production of classified information. Rather, the Supreme Court has held that “the protection of classified information must be committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include broad discretion to determine who may have access to it. Certainly, it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review the substance of such a judgment.” *Department of the Navy v. Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).

The statutory privilege applicable to NSA activities also effectively prohibits any investigation by the Commission. The National Security Act of 1959 provides that “nothing in this Act or any other law . . . shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency [or] of any information with respect to the activities thereof.” Pub. L. No. 86-36, § 6(a), 73 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has explained, the statute’s “explicit reference to ‘any other law’ . . . must be construed to prohibit the disclosure of information relating to NSA’s functions and activities as well as its personnel.” *Linder v. NSA*, 94 F.3d 693, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1996); *see also Hayden v. NSA/Central Sec. Serv.*, 608 F.2d 1381, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“Congress has already, in enacting the statute, decided that disclosure of NSA activities is potentially harmful.”). This statute displaces any authority that the Commission might otherwise have to compel, at this time, the production of information relating to the activities discussed in your letter.
I appreciate your interest in this important matter. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have further questions.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Kevin J. Martin
Chairman